In response to Wielenberg's first argument, it seems perfectly reasonable for the Theist to assert two propositions.  The first being that it is impossible for God’s character to be different than it is, and the second being that it is impossible to actually change the nature of moral perfection, as the evil contestant does in Wielenberg’s story.  The second claim rests on the first.  God’s character simply is the definition of moral perfection, and if His character cannot change, than neither can moral perfection.  But to the first proposition Wielenberg might ask why God’s character cannot change.  The response is simple, because if it did, then He would cease to be morally perfect, and thus cease to be God.  At this point, Wielenberg might accuse the Theist of a contradiction.  If God’s character cannot change without ceasing to be morally perfect, then isn’t there some outside standard to which we are holding God’s character?  To this the Theist may reply that God’s character is indeed the only standard of perfection, and that all things are either good or bad based on their relation to Him alone, but that His character, being what it is, cannot be otherwise.  It is simply a brute fact of the universe.  For God is the ground of all being, the source and foundation for all reality.  He simply is.  And he could not be otherwise.  If Wielenberg still wishes to object to this claim, then the Theist can quickly remind him that this is precisely what he wishes his reader to believe about the brute moral facts of the universe.  Indeed, this is the thesis of his book!  Moral facts such as “it is wrong to torture babies for fun” are, according to Wielenberg, real moral entities that exist and simply cannot be otherwise.  But as far I can tell, there is no reason to believe that brute moral facts cannot change and not believe that God’s character cannot change.  Thus, for Wielenberg to reject the Dependency Thesis for this reason would also be for him to reject his own moral theory.

    For the second argument, I believe that two possible responses are open to the Theist.  First, it can be argued that since a thing’s nature is given to it by God, it is still possible for something to be either good or evil by virtue of its nature, even though God indirectly made it so.  Taking the example of falling in love, a Theist might say that falling in love is most certainly an instance of intrinsic good, its very nature is simply and completely good, but that because its nature was given to it by God, it is ultimately God that has, in a sense, “declared” it to be what it is.  It sounds to me as though Wielenberg’s argument is actually saying, “nothing can be good in virtue of its nature because God gave it its nature.”  But of course that doesn’t follow.  What Wielenberg is really attacking is the notion that falling in love is not good for its own sake, but that it is good because God told us so.  What he overlooks is the simple solution that God “told us so” by giving it a nature that was either good or evil. 
   
    However, there is another response that seems perfectly reasonable to me, namely that the Theist simply accepts that nothing actually is intrinsically good or evil apart from God.  Why is suffering evil?  Because God doesn’t want his creatures to suffer.  Why is falling in love good?  Because God wants us to be happy, and in part because it facilitates the creation of families, children, and society.  Wielenberg is relying on the unshakable intuition that pain is evil in and of itself.  It is better to keep this obvious truth than to accept a theory that rejects it.  But isn’t it just as likely that the unshakable intuition in question is merely that pain is evil, leaving entirely open the question of why or how it is evil?  This seems more plausible to me.