Christian schools have not been immune from the impact of postmodernism. What are some of the ways Christian colleges and universities have been compromised by postmodern influences?

In the book, I discuss how postmodern thought has influenced a number of disciplines, and I trace those influences in terms of more secular schools first.  Then I draw an application to Christian schools, in that their professors often have been educated in the secular schools, and thus they have been educated in postmodern thought too.  You have to look at a school (and even department, and their profs) on a case-by-case basis. 

In terms of the inerrancy of Scripture, postmodernists have their own reasons for rejecting inerrancy as a fruitful way of talking.  While they will affirm the authority of Scripture, they have given up on our ability to determine if it is without errors.  That ability would presuppose, they think, an ability to compare the Scriptures with reality, to see if there are any errors.  But then we return to that same issue, just in a different context.

I see the expansion of literature on Christian postmodernism, in relation to various disciplines, growing mainly in the fields of theology, philosophy, ethics, and practical ministry, but there may well be more such work being done in other fields, too.

You’ve noted that one of the central claims of postmodernism is that we are trapped inside language and cannot get beyond it to know anything about the real world, and that this view is promoted by several Christian theologians. What is the most troubling affect this claim has on Christianity?

I have not met someone writing as a postmodern Christian who denies there is a real world that really exists.  However, they do tend to deny that we can know reality as it is.  If we cannot somehow know reality (or, certain aspects of reality) as it is, due to the pervasive influences of language, culture, etc., upon us, then we seem left with our perspectives and interpretations, without a way to know if they are indeed true (i.e., if our claims match up with reality).

However, the biblical writers make all sorts of claims about reality, including a core one for our faith, that Jesus actually arose bodily from the dead.  In 1 Cor. 15, Paul writes that if Jesus has not been raised from the dead, our faith is worthless.  Trouble is, on a postmodern kind of approach to the faith, we cannot know that Jesus actually arose from the dead.  Now, Paul, an eyewitness and apostle of Jesus thought quite differently, for he clearly wrote in that chapter that Christ has been raised, as a matter of historical fact.  However, if we cannot know reality as it is, including the facts about the resurrection, not only will that leave us as believers (and unlike Paul) without a key source for a substantial degree of confidence in the truth of our faith, but it also will put us in a bad position.  We end up constructing at least our view of reality, if not reality itself.  Nevertheless, since we cannot know reality as it is, in effect, what difference is there between constructing the world itself (by how we talk in our community), and constructing our view of reality?  After all, we have to live our lives, and as Christians, we are to live in light of the resurrection of Jesus.  But, on this kind of view, it seems we are left with living within what we have constructed.  The basis for our confidence that Jesus arose from the dead, then, is due to how we live and talk within our community (see my chapters 5 and 7, especially, for more explanation).

Foundationalism has become something of a dirty word for many postmodern Christians. They usually claim we ought to be post-foundationalist or non-foundationalist. What do they mean by this?

Foundationalism is a view in epistemology that is about how our beliefs should be structured, so that the justification (reasons, or evidence) of some “basic” (or, foundational) beliefs may in turn support non-foundational beliefs.  McLaren, for one, along with several others, criticize it as the modern culprit that has hoodwinked us into thinking that we must have absolute certainty in our beliefs.  Nancey Murphy also picks upon this line of criticism, but then she makes an interesting turn.  She rightly acknowledges that there are other versions of foundationalism alive and well today, besides this Cartesian version, which ought to be rejected.  However, she then argues that even so, the so-called “foundational” beliefs are dependent on our theories, too.  The key issue then is that we never have access to know reality as it truly is, apart from our theories, language, etc.  Every belief, even that I am alive now, or that I am 48 years old, or that Jesus has risen from the dead, are theory (or language) dependent.  Therefore, the real issue, for her and others, is that foundationalism presupposes that we can know reality as it is.  If you reject that view, you must turn to other forms of accounting for how our beliefs are justified, hence the turn toward “non-foundational” or “post-foundational” forms of justification.  For more, see her Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism, pp 90-93, as well as ch. 6 in my book.

Where do most philosophers (including Christians) actually stand on foundationalism?

Foundationalism is far from dead; in fact, it still is the dominant view about the structure of justification amongst philosophers.  I give a couple footnotes with key references on pages 53 and 113.