In response to Wielenberg's first argument, it seems perfectly reasonable for the Theist to assert two propositions.  The first being that it is impossible for God’s character to be different than it is, and the second being that it is impossible to actually change the nature of moral perfection, as the evil contestant does in Wielenberg’s story.  The second claim rests on the first.  God’s character simply is the definition of moral perfection, and if His character cannot change, than neither can moral perfection.  But to the first proposition Wielenberg might ask why God’s character cannot change.  The response is simple, because if it did, then He would cease to be morally perfect, and thus cease to be God.  At this point, Wielenberg might accuse the Theist of a contradiction.  If God’s character cannot change without ceasing to be morally perfect, then isn’t there some outside standard to which we are holding God’s character?  To this the Theist may reply that God’s character is indeed the only standard of perfection, and that all things are either good or bad based on their relation to Him alone, but that His character, being what it is, cannot be otherwise.  It is simply a brute fact of the universe.  For God is the ground of all being, the source and foundation for all reality.  He simply is.  And he could not be otherwise.  If Wielenberg still wishes to object to this claim, then the Theist can quickly remind him that this is precisely what he wishes his reader to believe about the brute moral facts of the universe.  Indeed, this is the thesis of his book!  Moral facts such as “it is wrong to torture babies for fun” are, according to Wielenberg, real moral entities that exist and simply cannot be otherwise.  But as far I can tell, there is no reason to believe that brute moral facts cannot change and not believe that God’s character cannot change.  Thus, for Wielenberg to reject the Dependency Thesis for this reason would also be for him to reject his own moral theory.

    For the second argument, I believe that two possible responses are open to the Theist.  First, it can be argued that since a thing’s nature is given to it by God, it is still possible for something to be either good or evil by virtue of its nature, even though God indirectly made it so.  Taking the example of falling in love, a Theist might say that falling in love is most certainly an instance of intrinsic good, its very nature is simply and completely good, but that because its nature was given to it by God, it is ultimately God that has, in a sense, “declared” it to be what it is.  It sounds to me as though Wielenberg’s argument is actually saying, “nothing can be good in virtue of its nature because God gave it its nature.”  But of course that doesn’t follow.  What Wielenberg is really attacking is the notion that falling in love is not good for its own sake, but that it is good because God told us so.  What he overlooks is the simple solution that God “told us so” by giving it a nature that was either good or evil. 
   
    However, there is another response that seems perfectly reasonable to me, namely that the Theist simply accepts that nothing actually is intrinsically good or evil apart from God.  Why is suffering evil?  Because God doesn’t want his creatures to suffer.  Why is falling in love good?  Because God wants us to be happy, and in part because it facilitates the creation of families, children, and society.  Wielenberg is relying on the unshakable intuition that pain is evil in and of itself.  It is better to keep this obvious truth than to accept a theory that rejects it.  But isn’t it just as likely that the unshakable intuition in question is merely that pain is evil, leaving entirely open the question of why or how it is evil?  This seems more plausible to me.

   In Chapter Two of Value And Virtue In A Godless Universe, Erik Wielenberg introduces two theses that he believes implicitly support Divine Command Theory.  The first is the Control Thesis which states that “every logically consistent ethical claim, E, is such that God could make E true.”   The second is the Dependency Thesis which states that “every true ethical claim is true in virtue of some act of will on the part of God.”  Essentially, the great difference between these two is that in the former God creates ethics (by divine fiat we might say), while in the later ethics is based upon and originates from God’s nature or character.  From this, Wielenberg distinguishes between two forms of Divine Command Theory.  The first or “strong” form accepts both the Control and Dependency Thesis, while the “weak” form accepts only the Dependency Thesis.

    It is important to consider Wielenberg’s objection to the strong form of Divine Command Theory first (which is essentially an objection to the Control Thesis), since it will play a role in his objection to the weak form.  He objects to the strong form by way of an illustration.   He asks us to imagine a competition in which the prize is omnipotence.  One contestant is a very good person, while the other is very evil.  Suppose, he says, that the evil person wins the contest and gains omnipotence.  According to the Control Thesis, the evil contestant can now make it such that all of the evil acts he intends to perform (mass slaughter of innocents, torture, etc.) are actually very good.  Moreover, he can make it such he is now a morally perfect being, not by changing himself, but by changing the nature of moral perfection.  Thus, in the end, evil becomes good and the killing and torture of innocent people is morally commendable.  Wielenberg relies primarily on intuition to argue that “there is simply no amount of power that would enable a being to make that true.”   He further argues that “This story seems to get things backwards by making morality subject to power.”  Fair enough.  Our moral intuitions certainly do seem to suggest to us that no amount of power could make such atrocities good.  We want to argue, especially as Christians, that morality is somehow objective and fixed, and that it could not be otherwise.  At least on the surface, Wielenberg’s argument seems to offer convincing reasons to reject the Control Thesis on just such grounds.  And so, for the sake of argument, we will grant him his conclusion.

    Now Wielenberg turns his philosophical gun on the weak form of Divine Command Theory, specifically on the Dependency Thesis, which he states as follows, “It is still divine willing that determines which ethical claims are true, but the scope of divine willing is limited by the divine character.”   In other words, God still retains the prerogative to say what things humans can and cannot do in certain times and places, but contra the Control Thesis He cannot command simply anything, but can only command those things which are in accordance with His own character, which sets the standard of moral goodness.  Wielenberg proposes three objections to this thesis.  First, he suggests that “implicit in the proposal is the notion that God has the power to make any logically consistent ethical claim true.”  In the weak claim, God’s character prevents Him from making evil things good, but Wielenberg seems to be suggesting that the Control Thesis still manages to slip in the back door, and that we are left with the same problem, just moved back a step.  If it were the case that God’s character turned out to be like the evil contestant in Wielenberg’s imaginary story, then even on the Dependency Thesis alone it would still be conceivable that God could make the slaughter of innocents a morally good thing.  But Wielenberg has already refuted such a notion. 

    Wielenberg’s second objection to the Dependency Thesis is even stronger.  He argues that an implication of the Dependency Thesis is that nothing is intrinsically good or evil.  He says, “If an act of will on the part of God bestows value on something distinct from God, that value cannot be intrinsic.”   By intrinsic value he means that a thing is valuable only in virtue of its nature.  As an example of an intrinsic evil, he suggests pain.  Pain is just bad, in and of itself, without reference to anything else.  Conversely, falling in love is intrinsically good; it is simply good for its own sake.  Following Chisholm, who argues that any theory of epistemology that doesn’t allow for obvious instances of knowledge should be rejected, Wielenberg suggests that any theory of morality that rejects something as obvious as the fact that some things are intrinsically good or evil should also be rejected. 

    What might the Christian say in response to these arguments?  Tune in tomorrow!

    When it comes to the gender debate, we must always keep sight of the Biblical picture of leadership.  Egalitarians frequently argue that our focus should not be on claiming our rights to authority over others, and I couldn’t agree more.  They argue that we should focus on serving one another, and again I couldn’t agree more.  But something that egalitarians would do well to remember is that true Biblical leadership is nothing more than the ultimate form of servanthood. 

    Christ has all power and authority and dominion over all the earth, and yet He humbled himself more than any human being possibly could.  The same is true for those who are called to lead in Christ’s church.  The powerful description of the way in which a husband is to love his wife (Ephesians 5) does not reveal some sort of egalitarian model of marriage, rather it reinforces the Biblical picture of true, Christ-like leadership.  For a husband to take on the role of head of his wife is for him to give up his own desires for her sake.  It is for him to always put her first, to always think of her before himself, and ultimately to give up his whole life for her (figuratively as well as in reality).  This is not a command to “mutually submit.”  Far from it.  This is a command to be a true Christian leader, as Christ was, and is, and ever will be. 

I was on facebook the other day, taking a silly quiz to see how "Reformed" I was.  As it turns out, the quiz was designed by Presbyterians, so it wasn't very accurate. 

One person, obviously irked by Reformation theology, left a rather cynical comment on the quiz's wall, along the lines of "child prostitution brings glory to God."  This person was attempting to raise the objection that, because the Reformed believe quite strongly that every event and every moment of history is ordained by God, for the purpose of glorifying Himself, they are left with the (supposedly) absurd conclusion that the most vile and wicked acts imaginable are somehow God-glorifying.  Child prostitution exists, according to this line of thought, because God in some sense wanted it to. 

I just want to say two things in response to this.  The first is that, as is often the case, this is a stilted charicature of Reformed theology.  No sane Reformed person actually believes that God possesses a disposition such that He actually delights in suffering.  There is a very real sense in which God does not want anyone to suffer, in this life or in the next.  He justly hates evil in every possible sense.  You'll also be hard pressed to find a Reformed theologian who will claim that the Fall (and the subsequent existence of sin and evil in the world) was somehow necessary.  What you will find is a commitment to the idea that, even though evil things are evil in and of themselves, and should not be considered good in any way, it must be the case that they exist for the good, or God would not allow them.  I think Reformed and non-Reformed alike should be able to agree on this.  The only other option is that God does not work all things for good (even if only the best good possible).

The second point is very important, and too often overlooked.  Typically it is said that Reformed theology places the ultimate blame on God, while Arminian forms remove from Him any such responsibility and place it back on us.  Here's the problem:  Both views must account for vile atrocities like child prostitution.  And both views believe in an omnipotent and wholly good God.  In short, both must still account for the problem of evil.  But to simply say, "well, it's human freedom" does little to get God off the hook.  At the heart of the so-called "free will defense" against the problem of evil is the notion that the free choice to love God is so infinitely beautiful and good that it is worth the price of child prostitution.  This is, to say the least, a contentious claim.  But more importantly, most advocates of this view will also argue that such free choices of love are supremely God-glorifying.  Arminian theology doesn't glorify man by placing all the emphasis on him and his choices, says the Arminian, but rather it places equal emphasis on God and His glory.  Fair enough.  But notice what the Arminian view is now saying:  God "allows" (rather than "ordains") child prostitution so that some can freely choose Him, to the end of glorifying Himself.  Does that sound familair? 

My point here is not necessarily to defend one view over the other.  I don't think I've made any case for Reformed theology here.  But we need to stop acting as though any one denomination has the sure-fire, bullet-proof response to something as immensely troubling and difficult as the problem of evil.  I don't hold to Reformed theology because I think it makes more sense of the problem of evil than Arminian theology, and I would strongly discourage anyone from holding to Arminian theology for the same reason.  If you can't accept Reformed doctrine because of exegetical concerns, or because you think it has no adequate grounding for moral responsibility, great!  All I wish to submit here is that the mere presence of evil in the world is not by itself sufficient grounds for accepting or rejecting either view.  It is, as they say, a two-way street.   

Quenching God's Oracles: The Condemnation of Montanism in Four Parts
Part 4: Conclusion

Previous Parts:
Part 1: Introduction & History of Montanism
Part 2: The Beliefs of the Montanists
Part 3: The Condemnation of the Montanists

Conclusion

Epiphanius noted that the Montanists “accept of the Old and New Testaments, and acknowledge likewise the resurrection of the dead, but they boast of having as a prophet one Montanus, and Priscilla and Maximilla as prophetesses, in adhering to whom they have turned from the truth.”[1] The early church did not condemn the Montanists for opposing the essential doctrines of the Christian faith, but rather condemned them on mostly prophetic grounds. Specifically, four accusations have been cited against the Montanists: the ecstatic irrational nature of the prophecies, false prophecies, misuse of Scripture, and the lifestyle of the prophets. Of these, it appears the accusation of false prophecy was the most common and the most serious.

Several conclusions about the early church can be drawn from this study for the aid of those looking to seriously apply the ancient-future paradigm. First, for each of the critics of Montanism examined, the gift of prophecy was understood to still exist. The cessation of prophecy or charismatic gifts was not the criticism; it was that the so-called prophets were false and misleading. Second, the standard by which to judge whether one is a true or false prophet has at least four criteria: awareness and logical coherence, factuality, coherence with Scripture, and lifestyle above reproach. If any of these criteria are not perfectly met, then the person in question is not a true prophet. Third, prophecy always refers to divine authority and is either true, and thus directly from God, or false, and thus directly against God. This third conclusion has specific application for the contemporary “Third-Wave” movement, which holds prophecy to be only a human report of what they think God has done.[2]

            Critics will charge these to be the opinions of some early church fathers and not necessarily biblical teaching. While these were the opinions of the fathers, these teaching were, however, based on their understanding of the Bible. Especially in light of the “ancient-future” paradigm contemporary Christians should not be so quick to dismiss those who were closer to the sources of the Bible (the apostolic authors) and contended earnestly through thoughtful argumentation for the Christian faith as they understood it. We would do well to learn from their examples: to take confidence in the authority and truth of God's word, to apply it ruthlessly in our theology and lifestyles, and act in boldness to defend the faith once for all delivered to the saints.

Quenching God's Oracles: The Condemnation of Montanism in Four Parts
Part 3: The Condemnation of the Montanists

Previous Parts:
Part 1: Introduction & History of Montanism
Part 2: The Beliefs of the Montanists

The Condemnation of the Montanists

            It should be clear that the Montanists were not condemned for disregarding traditional/orthodox beliefs about the Trinity and salvation. In fact, their adherence to these doctrines led some to accept the Montanists and even join them. However, most church leaders at the time did condemn the movement. Three main sources known today for condemning Montanism: “The Anonymous,” Apollonius, and Epiphanius. From these sources four specific reasons can be assembled: the ecstatic irrational nature of the prophecies, false prophecies, misuse of Scripture, and the lifestyle of the prophetic trio.

            Two of the sources are found in the history written by Eusebius, in which he recounts why the Montanists were condemned. The first is simply known as “the Anonymous.” After asserting that Montanus was seeking leadership, the Anonymous described how the prophecies came about: Montanus “became beside himself, and being suddenly in a sort of frenzy and ecstacy, he raved, and began to babble and utter strange things, prophesying in a manner contrary to the constant custom of the Church handed down by tradition from the beginning.”[1] He recounts that while some accused Montanus of being possessed by a demon, many were taken in by this display of power and followed the proclaimed prophet. F. David Farnell notes the standard the Anonymous used in judging the Montanists on this count: “For the Anonymous, such ecastic, irrational prophesying violated scriptural standards for prophecy…. Prophecies should come in an orderly and rational manner.”[2] The Anonymous attributed such activity by Montanus to Satan himself.

            False prophecy was the most common accusation against the Montanists, and the Anonymous accused them of this as well. One of problems in determining what exactly the Montanists said and did is that none of their own writings are currently known and very few quotes that are attributed to them. Even so, one of the quotes attributed to Maximilla says, “After me there will now longer be any prophetess. It will be the end of all.”[3] This “end of all” is understood to mean the second coming of Jesus Christ. The Anonymous was likely referring to a similar prophecy when he said, “And has not this been shown clearly to be false? For it is to-day more than thirteen years since the woman died, and there has been neither a partial nor general war in the world; but rather, through the mercy of God, continued peace among Christians.”[4]

            The third accusation leveled by the Anonymous is the misuse of Scripture. He seems to have been responding to the Montanists’ use of Matthew 23:34 when he said, “Since, therefore, they called us slayers of the prophets because we did not receive their loquacious prophets, who, they say, are those the Lord promised to send to the people, let them answer as in God’s presence: Who is there, O friends, of these who began to talk, from Montanus and the women down, that was persecuted by the Jews, or slain by lawless men? None. Or has any of them been seized and crucified for the Name? Truly not. Or has one of these women ever been scourged in the synagogues of the Jews, or stoned? No; never anywhere.”[5]

            Apollonius was Eusebius’s second source in recounting the condemnation of the Montanists. His first accusation had to do, once again, with the false prophecies of the Montanists, however, Eusebius does not record how Apollonius dealt with these prophecies. Farnell speculates that, “Since he discusses Apollonius’s refutation of Montanism right after his survey of the Anonymous, one may reasonably conclude that he may not have given details because this would have overlapped of much material already covered in the discussion on the Anonymous.”[6]

The second accusation made by Apollonius related to the practices and lifestyle of those in the movement, including Montanus. “We show that these first prophetesses themselves, as soon as they were filled with the Spirit, abandoned their husbands. How falsely therefore they speak who call Prisca [Priscilla] a virgin… Does not all Scripture seem to you to forbid a prophet to receive gifts and money? When therefore I see the prophetess receiving god and silver and costly garments, how can I avoid reproving her?”[7] This ultimately has to do with whether they were true or false prophets, since Apollonius held that, “It is necessary that all the fruits of a prophet should be examined.”[8]

Epiphanius accused the Montanists of some of these same things. He contended that the Montanists, “separated themselves, ‘adhering to spirits of error and doctrines of demons.’”[9] He too pointed to the false prophecies of the Montanists. “Everything that the [true] prophets have said, they also said rationally with understanding; and the things they said have come true and are still coming true. But Maximilla said that the consummation would come after her, and no consummation has come yet—even after so many emperors and such a lapse of time!”[10] The central point here is the false prophecy of Maximilla, but Epiphanius also alludes to true prophets speaking “rationally with understanding,” as if to say this is an essential quality of a true prophet absent from the Montanists. He clarified this later in saying, “Now what rational person who receives the ‘profitable’ message with understanding and cares for his salvation, can fail to despise a false religion like this, and the speech of someone who boasts of being a prophet but cannot talk like a prophet?”

            Misuse of Scripture is another similar accusation leveled by Epiphanius. “Apparently, the [Montanists] cited the sleep of Adam and his response to Eve’s creation in Genesis 2:21-23 as an example of proof for ecstatic prophecy.”[12] The response of Epiphanius was that, “Adam’s case was nothing like theirs… God brought the unconsciousness of sleep upon Adam, not distraction of mind… Adam’s senses and wits were not in abeyance.”[13] Epiphanius built a case condemning the Montanists for twisting scripture by showing that they changed the meaning of the text. He claimed that, “they wish to mix truth and falsehood and render senseless the minds of those who care about orthodoxy, and they gather for themselves passages by means of which they fabricate their error, claiming they have the same meaning.”[14]