Dr. Mike Horton is teaching a class on systematic theology at Christ United Reformed Church in Santee, California (where he serves as Associate Pastor).  The audio of the class is available online for free.  Dr. Horton will be coming out with a new, one-volume Systematic Theology for Zondervan next year, and this class is a sneak preview.  He's just finished the first section, "Prolegomena", and is now a few weeks into section two, "The Incommunicable Attributes of God."

To have a listen, click here. 


(Dr. Horton is also host of The White Horse Inn, a weekly radio show about theology and culture).

The gap that exists between the different schools of Apologetics (Classical, Evidential, Presuppositional) is becoming increasingly narrow.  After reading Zondervan's 5 Views On Apologetics, you'll come away wondering what the differences between these views actually are. 

In my term paper for my "Christian Mind" class this past Fall, I attempted to narrow the gap even more.  Specifically, I decided to look into the relationship between Presuppositionalism and Alvin Plantinga's "Reformed Epistemology."  In the paper, I argue that neither of these two "schools" is really a unique method of doing Apologetics.  Presuppositionalism is actually a critique of theological rationalism and Reformed Epistemology is, well, an epistemology!  I beleive that both of these schools  of thought can learn from each other and both have strong points that ought to inform our Apologetic method.  Lastly, because so many people do think of Presuppositionalism as a unique method of doing apologetics (and indeed those who consider themselves "Presuppositonal" claim that it is), I also offer an argument against Presuppositionalism as an apologetic system which I have labled the "Transcendental Argument against Presuppositionalism." 

Read the paper here. 

My friend and fellow grad student Nathaniel Taylor has written an argument for the existence of Hell using Anselmian "Perfect Being" philosophy.  It is interesting (and sure to be controversial) and worth a read for anyone interested in a defense of the traditional Evangelical doctrine of Hell.

You can read his argument at the blog Reason From Scripture (to which I am also a contributor). 

I wasn’t able to attend Jim’s paper this year, but he was kind enough to give me a copy anyway. This could be viewed as especially generous after I kept hassling him about Ty Cobb’s lifetime batting being incorrect on his blog. But now that it is fixed, I can recommend his blog without exception. Go read it for a lot of wisdom and a little folly.

 

The evidential problem of evil suggests that if God is all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good, then evil should not exist. Two popular theodicies (reasons for the existence of evil), free will and soul making, are rarely used together. For whatever reason, most apologists see them in opposition to one another. Spiegel argues that they are actually dependent on one another, that they have much in common and that they should be used together in answering the problem of evil.

 

The free will theodicy puts all the blame for evil on humans, arguing that God gave people freedom and this freedom is of such immense worth as to justify the existence of evil. This view usually sees the goal of freedom as the development of genuine love toward God and others.

 

For the soul making theodicy, evil exists for the purpose of shaping us into greater conformity to God’s likeness. God created us in His image, but there are some virtues that really cannot be developed without the experience of evil. These include qualities such as courage, forgiveness, and perseverance.

 

Both theodicies are basically means-ends explanations for evil, and are actually mutually dependent. Spiegel summarizes his argument: “In order for human freedom to necessitate the possibility (or reality) of evil the free will theodicy must specify the desirability of certain evil-contingent free choices, the good of which can be adequately accounted for only relative to the end of good moral character. On the other hand, this end-in-view of the soul-making theodicy—character development—is only achievable given the possibility of free will, since this is a pre-condition for moral agency and the requisite choices involved in acquiring second-order virtues.”

 

These theodicies each have similar objections with similar answers. Some have suggested that real evil is not necessary for character development. The problem is that illusory evil would only result in genuine character. Similarly, some suggest that only an illusion of free will in necessary to bring about genuine love. However, just like in the case of soul-making, virtual freedom only results in virtual love. Explanations for natural evil show where the theodicies diverge, but are still complimentary. The free will theodicy explains natural evil as the result of the Fall of humankind, while soul-making explains it as part of the evil allowed in order to shape people into God’s likeness. In this way, the soul-making theodicy is more teleological. So while one theodicy may be preferred over the other, they are in fact mutually dependent and complimentary.

UPDATE: Jim has posted his paper at his blog, so you can read the entire paper there.

Here are a couple of my summaries of Jim's papers from past years:

ETS 2005: James Spiegel on Ethics and Art

ETS 2006- James Spiegel: The Epistemic Ramifications of Behavior

With Proposition 8 on the ballot in California, it is important to stop and think about the issue of marriage and family in general and how these institutions relate to the state.  How should a Christian (or anyone) approach the issue of state-sanctioned same-sex marriage from a philosophical and political point of view?  Is there a case to be made for traditional marriage apart from the Bible?    Is this simply an issue that should be left to the individual?

Dr. Scott Clark of Westminster Seminary California addresses these questions on his blog.  Without addressing prop 8 specifically, Dr. Clark attempts to sketch a foundation for thinking about the relationship between marriage and the state from a Natural Law perspective, drawing from both Christian and Pagan thought.

Here is a rather lengthy and meaty paragraph to give you the gist of his argument:


Read Dr. Clark’s full article at the heidelblog.  

Saint Augustine felt a considerable amount of anguish at being “in time.”  So much so that he considered it to be a part of salvation itself that we are saved from time into timelessness.  

But that raises an interesting question.  How can finite beings be timeless?  Our very finitude, by definition, seems to consign us to the temporal.  Try to imagine experiencing reality in any other way than “past-now-future” (or, as Augustine said, “memory-observation-expectation”) and you’ll be scratching your head for a long time (see, there’s that word again).  

Augustine was not setting out to give a philosophical account of time, but merely reflections on his own experience of time.  In a similar fashion, there might be a way to reconcile Augustine’s desire to be freed from the moment-by-moment passage of time and humanity’s “bondage” to the temporal.  

As the old saying goes, time flies when you’re having fun.  Thinking back on all of those moments in my life where I found this sentiment to be true, I can remember what seemed to be “timeless” experiences.  If you’ve ever had a moment where you suddenly looked at a clock and said, “Wow, is it that late already?” then you know basically what I’m talking about.  

As it turns out, there are only two kinds of situations that I can think of where the passage of time is actually self-evident:  (1) When one is bored or otherwise miserable and can’t wait for a certain amount of time to be over, or (2) when one is having the best time of his life and doesn’t want the time to come to an end (and so is constantly looking at his watch and dreading the impending end of his happiness).  With regard to (1) you could almost say that there is an inverse relationship between a person’s happiness and their awareness of the passage of time.  With a few exceptions, a general rule could be that the happier you are the less likely you are to notice time passing.  Since we can safely assume that times of boredom and misery will be scarce in Heaven, we can get rid of (1).  

What about (2)?  I think there are two ways to look at it.  You can deny that the person is actually happy whenever he checks his watch, because at the moment he does so he is actually feeling anxiety and not happiness.  But that could be debated.  A much simpler answer would be that, in Heaven, the very fact of eternity will mean that our happiness will literally never end.  And thus the dread of our happiness ending will never be a possibility.  

In one sense, then, it is not time itself that we are delivered from in salvation, but rather those conditions that make the passage of time so painful to us here on fallen, sinful Earth.  Just think back to what it felt like when you were experiencing one of those "timeless" moments, and then imagine feeling that way for all eternity, and I think you may just have a very dim idea of what Heaven will feel like. 

Dr. Richards’ purpose was to respond to an argument popular amongst atheists in the blogosphere, and he also attributed it to skeptic Michael Shermer. The argument typically goes something like this: ID theorists believe order in nature is due to intelligent design because they see “reliable indicators.” Many of these theorists also favor free markets. However, market order cannot be designed, as exemplified by the failed attempts to plan economies that ended in disaster. Free market order is an example of the appearance of design without a designer, therefore ID theorists live in contradiction.

Hayek and other notable economists have argued that it is epistemologically impossible to plan markets. Free markets coordinate goods between producers and consumers who are often unaware of each other in a way that usually benefits all who are involved. To plan such a market would require an incredible amount of knowledge that simply isn’t feasible.

Adam Smith claimed that people develop goods because of self-interest, the primary motivation is not the interest of others. Smith believed an “invisible hand” guides the promotion of better goods in such a market. Interestingly, Smith was a deist and believed that this hand was God’s providence.

Hayek put forward a more sophisticated argument against the notion that markets can be designed:

1)      Subjective Theory of (Economic) Value- Value is determined by what the consumer is willing to pay for the product.

2)      Humans are not telepathic or omniscient.

3)      Therefore, no human can coordinate a market better than the spontaneous ordering of a market.

Perhaps one could plan an incredibly limited market, but markets of any complexity require spontaneous order. Hayek went a step further and claimed that order from chaos occurs in natural sciences (i.e. natural selection), so there’s no principled problem with finding order from chaos in economics. Hayek would have been wiser to stick to his area of study.

Does Hayek’s argument show that markets can’t be designed? He has shown that no human can plan a market, but could God? Of course- God is omniscient so He has the knowledge required for such a task. Hayek’s argument works well against socialist planning of markets, but does not prove that markets can’t be designed by a being with knowledge of everything.

There is much discussion these days about the dangers of confidence.  Those who think their beliefs are true are feared and even hated.  Evil of all sorts has been traced back to confidence, and confidence is declared its root and source.  The remedy for evil in this view, then, is for everyone to reduce their confidence in their beliefs.  It's commonly thought that this would make the world a better place. 

On the other hand, on this blog (see here and here, for example) I've argued that confidence is a morally neutral trait.  Instead, what matters is what you're putting your confidence in.  If your confidence is well placed in the true and the good then great good will follow.  But if your confidence is wrongly placed in false and evil ideas, then great evil will follow.  The problem, therefore, is the false beliefs, not the confidence which can serve either good or evil.  The remedy for evil in this view is for everyone to address the actual beliefs people hold, encouraging others to reduce their confidence in false beliefs and raise their confidence in true ones.  The greater confidence people have in good, true beliefs, the better off this world will be.

If this second view is correct, then seeing confidence as the root of evil and pressuring everyone to have less confidence will have the unfortunate effect of causing a net loss of not only bad things in this world, but also a great deal of good.  To do good is a very, very difficult enterprise--one that is often met with ridicule and intense opposition (just look at Jesus).  Confidence is an absolute necessity for anyone who would persevere through this.

William Wilberforce is a perfect example of the blessings of confidence.  How was he able to fight for twenty years, enduring scorn and personal attacks day in and day out, to put an end to the slave trade in England?  Listen to his own explanation:

The grand object of my parliamentary existence [is the abolition of the slave trade]. . . Before this great cause all others dwindle in my eyes, and I must say that the certainty that I am right here, adds greatly to the complacency [i.e., the settled, peaceful confidence] with which I exert myself in asserting it. If it please God to honor me so far, may I be the instrument of stopping such a course of wickedness and cruelty as never before disgraced a Christian country.

Wilberforce was certain that he was right about what was wicked and cruel, and he was certain that the right thing for him to do was to stop that wickedness.  That is what drove him steadily on to end the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people.  Would you have chided him for his confidence?  If so, what if he had listened to you?  What if all the abolitionists had listened to you?  The world would now be a much uglier place.

Let's work to end evil, not confidence.

I find Dr. Spiegel to be one of the most intriguing philosophers of our time. He’s one of the few presenters that I’ll probably highlight every year from ETS.

 

The contemporary understanding of the relationship between behavior and beliefs is that our actions flow from our cognitions. However, several Old Testament texts seem to suggest otherwise (Psalm 19:7, 25:9, Proverbs 1:4). Dr. Spiegel aims to explore how behavior impacts our beliefs.

 

His case is built on the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. For Plantinga, a belief has “warrant” if 1) belief-forming mechanisms function properly, 2) operation is done in a favorable environment, 3) the cognitive system is successfully aimed at truth, and 4) there exists a sensus divinitatis. This is defined by Plantinga as “a kind of facult or cognitive mechanism… which in a wide variety of circumstances produces in us beliefs about God.” (Warranted Christian Belief, 154)

 

Sin has corrupted our cognitions and affections, such that the sensus divinitatis has been baldy damaged. This skews our ability to love and hate the right things accurately. Linda Zagzebski has criticized Plantinga’s model for being deficient of virtue consideration. We should consider some virtue amendments that are important for our intellectual life, as well as our formation into good persons.

 

One such virtue is that of phronesis, or practical wisdom. This is the sort of insight that may be described as a truth conducting intellectual quality necessary for moral conduct. Aristotle believed that without this virtue, we couldn’t be morally virtuous. We should also seek sophia, or speculative wisdom. In contrast to phronesis, sophia has nothing to do with conduct, it is solely an intellectual virtue. These two virtues are both intellectual virtues of insight, but one is in practical matters and the latter is in theoretical. Zagzebksi adds that phronesis is a higher-order virtue that governs all others (moral and intellectual).

 

One way our behaviors affect our beliefs is derivatively. For example, I must decide what to expose myself to in regards to mass media. My selection of which shows I watch, websites I visit, or radio stations I listen to will impact my attitudes and beliefs either negatively or positively.

 

Romans 1:18-28 presents us with a moral vicious cycle from suppression of truth to ignorance of God to epistemic corruption and further bad behavior. One way this occurs is through self-deception, such as the Christian minister who taught there’s nothing wrong with porn because it doesn’t involve touching. William James suggested that beliefs are emotions. Accordingly, regardless of the method used to arrive at our conviction, “the fundamental phenomenological feature of these convictions is emotional: our belief feels right. This, says James, is the sentiment of rationality.” For example, when we slander, the emotional pleasures we feel from it displaces our previous negative emotional associations with it. This makes the offense more likely to be repeated, thus presenting another vicious cycle.

 

These are corruption of the original design plan, disturbing the proper-function of our belief-forming mechanisms, creating environments hostile to correct belief formation, and further destruction of the sensus divinitatis. Conversely, the practice of virtues (instead of vices) avoids these negative epistemic effects. Exposure to beauty of all kinds improves the moral imagination, which is important to moral action. Good conduct, then, maximizes our cognitive functions while minimizing corruption due to sin. Virtuous actions result in the strengthening of our faith. Instead of a vicious cycle, here we have a “virtuous cycle.”

 

The negative fallout from sin resulting from its compromise of phronesis, which governs both moral and intellectual virtues, shows that behavior effects us epistemically. We should therefore seek to acquire phronesis both for it’s practical and intellectual benefits.

A few weeks ago (yikes--has it been that long?), I promised Brian a response to his comment on my post, "Postmodernism Will Lead to Violence."   Brian argued that there's no way, yet, to determine which worldview (modernism or postmodernism) would be more destructive when mixed with our sinful tendencies.  However, he believes that the record of history argues against modernism (specifically, against people holding the idea that we can know and be confident about truth).

 

First, I think the root of the problems that have occurred within modernism was not that people thought they were right.  History has shown that the bad didn't come when people thought they were right, the bad came when people were wrong about what they thought was right (how to behave, what is good, the right way to persuade, etc.).  Thinking one is right is actually neutral and can serve either good or evil.  When people were right and thought they were right, great goodness was accomplished.  I think, then, it's a definite harm to try to get all people not to care so much about things because one then loses a strong, persevering goodness along with everything else.

 

If being wrong (about ideas and right behavior) is actually the core problem (as I'm saying it is), then without an objective, universal standard to appeal to (one that is true and that can be known), the world will be even less likely to know or care about the right way to behave, and people will drift farther and farther towards their sinful tendencies, leading to a worse world.  If the core problem is people being objectively wrong, then the solution is to persuade people of what constitutes true goodness so that society will uphold that standard through rewards and punishments. 

 

If, in contrast to this (and according to postmodern Christians), the core problem is strong beliefs, passion, and commitment stemming from the confidence that one knows what is good and true, then therefore, the solution is to quench everyone's zeal--zeal for both good and bad--because we can't determine what is right; therefore, better to stop everyone's confidence just in case.  This is the reasonable conclusion if, as a postmodernist, one has given up on knowing what is good.  I'm not willing to give up the good (either on knowing it or on trying to reason with others to recognize it), and I don't see any reason biblically to think this is the course we should take.

 

So how can we judge between these two worldviews to determine which would be more destructive when mixed with our sin?  Would one lead to a more just, good society than the other?  As I said, it depends on what is really our core problem (having wrong ideas/values or being passionate/thinking one is right) and what is the true solution for improving societal behavior (a corrective standard that can be known or a reducing of one's confidence in knowing).

 

I can only give you this as a way to determine between the two:  First, read the Old Testament.  It is centered around God giving the Law--the standard of goodness--which He says specifically is not beyond their comprehension (Deut 30:11-14).  From that point on, the rest of the Old Testament is about the negative results that occur when the Israelites forget the standard (the truth revealed by God) and the positive results when they remember it.  Meanwhile, the prophets' purpose is to continually call people back to the standard and to measure the nation's behavior against it.  It does seem that God encourages confidence in a standard.

 

Then read the New Testament.  Paul seems intent on our increasing our knowledge.  He reasons with us in order to increase our confidence (1 Cor 15:1-19) and challenges us to persevere in the knowledge we have "become convinced of" (2 Tim 3:14-17) for the purpose of fulfilling the work we've been given to maintain the standard of truth (4:1-5).  John makes a case for the truthfulness of Christian belief (1 John 1:1-4) and shares it with us so we can know we have eternal life (5:13).  Jude even pleads with us to "contend earnestly for the faith" (Jude 3).  We are specifically called to be strong in our beliefs yet to display that strength in love (1 Cor 16:13-14).  (Note that the corrective offered for the dangers of strong belief is true belief held in love, not a decrease in the strength of that belief.)

 

God thought these things were extremely important.  But where are the passages exhorting us not to believe too strongly we are right lest we cause harm?  Or those claiming (or even demonstrating) that we should not attempt rational persuasion of those who disagree?  If this were the correction we really needed, and these views would truly bring about a greater good than believing we know truth and the standard for goodness, wouldn't God have focused on these things instead of urging us to increase our confidence and strength in His truth?